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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the office of the presidency in both India and the 
U.S.A. is a history of growing influence, prestige and authority. The 
constitutional provisions and the change of circumstances have been mainly 
responsible for this fast growth of power. The fundamental laws of the 
nation, as well as the unwritten constitution, require that each president 
justify his approach to the work of his office. Although the constitution 
of the U.S.A. does not speak of emergency powers in clear terms as does 
the Constitution of India, yet, in many cases, the president of the U.S.A. 
has issued orders containing the force of emergency powers. On the other 
hand, the Indian president has exercised this power as granted to him by 
the Constitution of India. Both of these presidencies have exercised this 
authority for the safety and welfare of their respective states. But there 
have been some doubts about the genuineness of this use of authority in the 
past. This research paper will try to find out the answers to all such 
doubts. 
The fundamental questions to which this research paper will try to 
secure answers to are the following: 
1. Is there any need for this power--emergency power--incorporated 
in the written constitution of the state? 
2. Have emergency powers--implied or explicit--been used in the 
past with caution or carelessly, frequently or with long inter- 
vals, and with what end in sight? 
3. Has this power brought any effective changes in the office of 
the presidency in the United States and India during the past 
fifteen years? 
The sources of this research will be fairly extensive. The most 
important sources will be books, published articles, periodicals, the 
Congressional Digest, the Congressional Record, the Constituent Assembly 
Debates (India), the Parliamentary Debates, and memoirs of some of the 
former presidents of both countries. Also, government documents, govern- 
ment bulletins and daily papers will supply valuable materials to this 
project. 
CHAPTER I 
A STUDY OF INDIAN AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHIES 
In this age of nuclear weaponry and outer space exploration, the 
words of Abraham Lincoln, ". . . government of the people, by the people, 
and for the people .", I are still valid both in the United States and 
India. Both the United States and Indian constitutions have pinned faith 
in the philosophy that the people are the source of sovereignty. The 
Preamble to the United States Constitution reads: 
We the People of the United States, In Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America. 2 
1William E. Barton, Lincoln at Gettysburg (New York: Peter Smith, 
1950), p. 82. 
2 Preamble to the Constitution of the United States. 
3 
The Preamble of India's Constitution expresses the same ideology 
in a different style, with similar political, social and economical ends. 
It says: 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, Have solemnly resolved to constitute 
India into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all 
its citizens: 
JUSTICE, Social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity, and to promote among 
them all; 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the 
unity of the Nation; 
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 
1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.3 
Both of these constitutions have numerous points in common, one of 
which is their basic concept of democratic values. These values, equality, 
liberty and fraternity, have, on many occasions, been put to trial in both 
India and the United States, and they have survived the tests. 
The Constitution of India, like the Constitution of the United 
States, declared that India is a sovereign democratic republic. The Presi- 
dent of India is to be elected for a number of years through indirect elec- 
tion by the people. This philosophy of republicanism and democratization 
of the office of presidency has its source in the Constitution of the United 
States. 4 The democratic nature of the constitution is emphasized by the 
fact that the system of universal adult franchise has been accepted as the 
guiding principle of election to public offices. 
3 
Preamble to the Constitution of India. 
4Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India (third 
edition; Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons Ltd., 1956), Vol. II, p. 417. 
4 
The Constitution of India, like the Constitution of the United 
States and unlike that of Great Britain, is a written constitution. It 
contains 395 Articles and 8 Schedules. The Indian Constitution, unlike 
the U.S., is a bulky one and probably the lengthiest in the whole world.5 
The bulk of the constitution is due to many causes. The constitution con- 
tains not only the broad principles as we find in the Constitution of the 
United States, but also the details of administration. The Indian Cons- 
titution provides not only for the administrative machinery at the center, 
but also of the units or states. The units of the Indian Union, unlike 
the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and Canada, are of many kinds and provision had 
to be made separately for each one of them. The incorporation of the 
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy, and other 
similar provisions, have made this constitution a bulky constitution. The 
Indian Constitution provides for amendment, the pertinent provision being 
Article 368 6 which provides that a bill for amendment must be passed by 
each House by a majority of the total number of members of the House in 
any case not less than two-thirds of the members of the House present and 
voting and receive the assent of the President. This special majority is 
not required in case of some provisions of the Constitution. Some of the 
provisions of the Constitution require for their amendment ratification 
by Legislatures of not less than half of the States after they are passed 
by the Houses of the Parliament with a two-third majority and before they 
are presented to the President for assent. This method of amendment is 
5R. R. Sethi and Vidya Dhar Mahajan, Indian Constitution and 
Administration (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1954), p. 78. 
5 
based on the doctrine that what the people have created, the people can 
change. 
The United States Constitution has its Bill of Rights, the name 
usually given to the first eight amendments. The Fundamental Rights in 
India's Constitution are the Indian counterpart of these provisions in 
the U.S. Constitution. India's Fundamental Rights include freedom of 
speech and expression, the right to assemble peacefully, freedom of re- 
ligion, freedom from discrimination against a citizen on grounds of re- 
ligion, race, sex or place of birth. The Indian Constitution, like the 
United States Constitution, provides a guarantee against self-incrimina- 
tion, 7 and abolishes traffic in human beings and other similar forms of 
forced labor. 8 
India and the United States, to a large degree, share a philosophy 
respecting the relation of the State to the Church. Some 2,000 years ago, 
Jesus advised, "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, 
and to God the things that are God's" (Luke 20:25). This political philos- 
ophy is the root of the present day doctrine of separation of Church and 
State that operates in the United States. That doctrine found expression 
in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Separation of Church and 
State is also reflected in India's basic charter. 
The Indian Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, provides for 
a federal form of government. It establishes a dual polity. The dual 
polity consists of the Union at the center and the State at the periphery, 
7The Constitution of India, Article 20 (3). See Appendix. 
6 
each endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned 
to them, respectively by the constitution. The powers of the Union and 
the State are clearly demarcated. The Constitution is written and enact- 
ments in excess of the assigned powers by either the Union or the State 
legislatures are invalid. Moreover, no amendment which makes any changes 
in the status or powers of the center or of the units is possible without 
the concurrence of the Union and a State majority. The Constitution also 
establishes a Supreme Court to decide disputes between the Union and the 
States. The Supreme Court also acts as the interpreter of the Constitution 
However, there are some provisions in the Indian Constitution that go to 
make it a semi-federal constitution or in other words--a quasi federal 
constitution. It can be said that the Indian Constitution establishes a 
unitary State with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal State 
with subsidiary unitary features. 9 
The right view is that the Indian Constitution is a federal one. 
It does not violate the essentials of a federal polity. 10 However, certain 
changes have been made with a view to adjust the federal system to the need! 
of India. The federal polity of India can be converted into a unitary polit 
in times of emergency only and not otherwise. This only shows that the 
Indian Constitution is so flexible that it can be adjusted to meet any crisi 
that faces the country. In the Constitution of Switzerland also, it is 
9G. N. Joshi, The Constitution of India (London: MacMillan and Co., 
Limited, 1950), p. 39; K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (second edition; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 28. 
10 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India (third 
edition; Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons Ltd., 1956), Vol. I, p. 12. 
7 
provided that the federal government can intervene in any canton if dis- 
order in the canton endangers the safety of the State. During the first 
and second world wars, the defense powers of the federal government was 
given so extended an interpretation by the courts of the U.S.A., Australia 
and Canada, that those countries behaved more like unitary than federal 
States. 11 
India's Constitution has features not found in the Constitution of 
the United States. For example, Article 16 (1) provides that "there shall 
be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employ- 
ment or appointment to any office under the State. "12 Article 24 provides 
that "no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work 
in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment. "13 
An even more striking feature of the Indian Constitution, not found 
in the United States Constitution, is the provision for preventive deten- 
tion, Article 22 (4)-(7), 
14 
at the discretion of the executive. 
Another feature of the Indian Constitution which is not found in the 
United States Constitution is the Directive Principles of State Policy con- 
tained in Articles 36 to 51. These directive principles set forth the 
economic, social, and political goals of the Indian Constitutional System. 
11William 0. Douglas, We the Judges (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., 1956), p. 37. 
12_ 
The Constitution of India. 
13 
The Constitution of India. 
14 
The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
8 
In these directive principles of State policy will be found the entire 
philosophy on which the "welfare state" in any modern community is 
founded. 15 They speak of the attainment of Justice--social, political 
and economic--and liberty of expression, belief, faith and worship. 
THE NATURE OF THE PRESIDENCY: INDIA 
The Constitution of India has adopted the British model of the 
Cabinet System of responsible government. On the question of the form of 
government, opinion in the Constituent Assembly was at first divided. There 
were those who advocated the adoption of the presidential system of govern- 
ment prevalent in the United States of America. 16 They had two major argu- 
ments in support of their view. First, the presidential form of government 
enables the executive head (the President) to be elected directly by the 
people. Secondly, what India needed most was a stable government. A 
presidential system could insure stability as the head of the executive 
was elected for a fixed period. 17 However, those who advocated the presi- 
dential system formed only a small minority in the Assembly. 
The decision to adopt the cabinet system was the result of a long 
debate in the Constituent Assembly. The two issues which were raised during 
15-D- 
ouglas, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
16 Debates in the Constituent Assembly of India, Vol. VIII (Delhi: 
Government of India Publication, 1950), pp. 975-980. K. T. Shas was the 
most ardent champion of this group. 
17 C.A.D., Vol. VIII, p. 284. 
9 
the discussion were (1) what would make for the strongest executive con- 
sistent with a democratic constitutional structure; and (2) what was the 
form of executive which was suited to the conditions of this country. 
Giving his views in answer to these questions, Mr. K. M. Munshi said: 
The strongest government and the most elastic executive has 
been found to be in England and that is because the executive 
powers rest in the Cabinet supported by a majority in the Lower 
House which has financial power under the Constitution. As a 
result, it is the rule of the majority in the legislature; for 
it supports its leaders in the Cabinet, which advises the head 
of the State, namely, the King . We must not forget a very 
important fact that, during the last hundred years, Indian 
public life has largely drawn upon the traditions of British 
constitutional law. Most of us looked up to the British model 
as the best Our constitutional traditions have become 
parliamentary and we have now all our provinces functioning 
more or less on the British model.18 
These considerations were reinforced by two additional arguments 
of special significance from A. Krishnaswami Aiyar. 19 The first of these 
related to the form of government in the States. The presidential form 
of government would have meant that the administrators of the States 
would have been invested with real executive power and the legislature 
would have been confined purely to their legislative functions. 
Secondly: 
There are obvious difficulties in the way of working the 
Presidential system. Unless there is some kind of close union 
between the Legislature and the Executive, it is sure to result 
in a spoils system. . Parliament may take one line of action 
and the Executive may take another line of action. An infant 
democracy cannot afford, under modern conditions, to take the 
18 C.A.D., Vol. VIII, p. 989. 
19M. V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India (Bombay: Asia Pub- 
lishing House, 1960), p. 324. 
10 
risk of a perpetual cleavage, feud or conflict between the 
Legislature and the Executive. The object of the present 
constitutional structure is to prevent a conflict between 
the Executive and the Legislature and to promote harmony 
between the different parts of the governmental system. 
After weighing the pros and cons of the Parliamentary Execu- 
tives as they obtain in Great Britain, in the Dominions and 
in some of the Continental Constitutions, and the Presidential 
type of government as it obtains in the United States of Ameri- 
ca, the Indian Constitution has adopted the institution of 
Parliamentary Executive.20 
Prime Minister Nehru also spoke in the Assembly on this subject 
and said that after giving anxious thought to this matter, they had come 
to the conclusion that emphasis should be given to the ministerial charac- 
ter of the government and power resided in the Ministry and Legislature 
and not in the President as such. 
Since India is a republic, the Constitution provides for a Presi- 
dent of India and the executive power of the Union government, including 
the supreme command of the defense forces, is vested in him. 
CHAPTER II 
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF INDIA AND THE U.S.A. 
Peaceful climate may change and certain adversities may happen to 
the daily life of a nation. To meet these, modern constitutions provide 
the president with powers to deal with in order to protect people and 
nation, and maintain order and tranquility. The Indian Constitution has, 
by Part XVIII, provided the executive with ample powers to meet abnormal 
or emergency situations. Part XVIII speaks of the emergency provisions 
20 
Pylee, op_t cit., p. 324. 
11 
under the Constitution of India. This part visualizes three different 
types of abnormal situations: (1) an emergency due to internal distur- 
bance or external aggression; (2) failure of constitutional machinery 
in the States; and (3) financial emergency. 
EMERGENCY DUE TO INTERNAL DISTURBANCE OR EXTERNAL AGGRESSION 
Article 352 of the Indian Constitution speaks that "if the Presi- 
dent is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of 
India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by 
war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, 
make a declaration to that effect." 21 The President of India used this 
right to proclaim emergency during Chinese aggression on Indian soil which 
caused danger to national security and existence. This emergency is still 
in effect. The Constitution of India empowers the Chief of the State--the 
President--to issue a proclamation of emergency before the actual occur- 
rence of war, aggression or disturbance, if he alone is satisfied that there 
is such danger in sight. This power to proclaim emergency has been placed 
subject to two restrictions. First, the proclamation has to be placed befor 
each House of Parliament. The Constitution does not, however, specify the 
period during which this obligation has to be fulfilled. Secondly, the 
proclamation ceases to be operative at the expiration of two months unless 
before the expiration of this period, the Parliament has given its approval 
21 
The Constitution of India. 
12 
to the President's proclamation. 
FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN THE STATES 
Article 356 empowers the President to make proclamation whenever 
he is satisfied that the government of a State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution either on the report 
of the Governor or otherwise. 
This provision means that the failure of a State government to 
work according to the Constitution, in circumstances which have no neces- 
sary connection with external aggression, internal disturbance or vio- 
lence, though these may be the cause of failure in particular cases, em- 
powers the President to declare emergency. 23 A failure within the mean- 
ing of the present Article may probably arise also in the case of abuse 
of constitutional powers by a State government. In the States of Andhra 
and the Punjab and also in Orissa, party politics paved the way for the 
President to proclaim emergency. After the fall of the ministry in Andhra 
by a vote of no confidence and after the resignation of the ministries in 
the Punjab and Orissa, presidential rule was introduced on the alleged 
ground that no alternative ministry could be formed. 
22 
The Constitution of India. 
FINANCIAL EMERGENCY 
13 
Article 360 provides that "if the President is satisfied that a 
situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India 
or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, he may be a Proclama- 
tion make a declaration to that effect," 24 
All the provisions regarding political emergency (Article 352) shall 
apply to this proclamation of financial emergency. During the period this 
proclamation is in operation, the executive authority of the Union extends 
to the giving of directions to any State to observe such canons of finan- 
cial propriety as may be specified in the directions, and to the giving 
of such other directions as the President may deem necessary and adequate 
for the purpose. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution 
(a) any such direction may include (1) a provision requiring the reduction 
of salaries and allowances of all or any class of persons serving in con- 
nection with the affairs of a State; (2) a provision requiring all Money 
25 
Bills or other Bills to which the provisions of Article 207 apply (Finan- 
cial Bills) to be reserved for the consideration of the President after the3 
are passed by the Legislature of the State; and (b) it is competent for the 
President during the period any Proclamation of financial emergency is in 
operation to issue directions for the reduction of salaries and allowances 
of all or any class of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the 
Union including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 
The issue of a proclamation of emergency has a twofold consequence. 
24 
The Constitution of India. 
2 
5The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
14 
In the first place, it virtually amounts to the negation of the federal 
character of the Constitution. The States affected by the proclamation 
get reduced to a position of a county council of a unitary State. Under 
Article 353 26 the executive powers of the States are brought directly under 
the supervision and control of the Union government. Secondly, the Union 
Parliament gets authority to make laws on any matter and confer powers 
and impose duties on Union and officers of the Union even though the mat- 
ter is not in the Union List. 
This shows that the distribution of powers between the Union and 
the units may be completely changed by proclamation of emergency by the 
President. The Union by this proclamation gets a chance to encroach upon 
the authorities of the States and reduce the State's position to a sub- 
ordinate unit of a unitary system. 
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In the U.S.A. Constitution there are no separate provisions dealing 
with abnormal situations. As the Supreme Court of the United States ob- 
served in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.: 
Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitu- 
tional power. The constitution established a national govern- 
ment with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to 
be in both war and peace, but these powers of the national 
government are limited by the constitutional grants.27 
26 
The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
27 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., (1935) 295 U.S.9528. 
15 
Chief Justice Hughes propounded a sound philosophy of American constitu- 
tional law by observing that emergency does not create any power or grant 
any authority to the executive to superimpose its claim on others. In 
another important case, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 
Chief Justice Hughes opined: 
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase 
granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon 
power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a 
period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the federal 
government and its limitations of powers of the States were de- 
termined in the light of emergency and they are not altered by 
emergency. What power was thus granted and what limitations 
were thus imposed are questions which have always been, and al- 
ways will be, the subject of close examination under the cons- 
titutional system.28 
Thus, the President of the United States can not exercise any extra- 
ordinary powers in view of any emergency. While emergency does not create 
power, emergency may furnish the President an opportunity for exercise of 
a power. "Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has 
never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion 
of a living power already enjoyed" by the President. 29 The court has al- 
ways tried to be reasonable to such use of power at a time of real emer- 
gency and war. As Justice Holmes said in the Schenck Case: 
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in 
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their 
utterance will not be endured as long as men fight and no court 
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." 
28Home Building Association v. Blaisdell, (1933) 290 U.S., 425. 
29Wilson v. New, (1918) 245 U.S., 332-348.. 
"Schenck v. U.S., (1919) 249 U.S., 52. 
16 
Under Article 355 of the Indian Constitution the Union is under 
obligation "to protect every State against external aggression and internal 
disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of thesConstitution." 31 This provision 
has its origin in the United States and Australian constitutions. The 
Constitution of the United States provides: 
The United States shall guarantee to every state in the union a 
republican form of government and shall protect each of them against 
invasion and on application of the Legislature or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature can not be convened) against domestic vio- 
lence.32 
Likewise, Section 119 of the Australian Constitution reads: "The Common- 
wealth shall protect every state against invasion and, on the application 
of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence." 33 
The duty imposed on the federal government in the United States to 
guarantee the republican form in the States may lead one to think that it 
may prohibit or suspend such State governments as do not, in its judgement, 
conform to the requirement. But there has been no instance in practice so 
far to the effect that the Government of the United States has suspended 
or interfered with a State government on the ground that the latter has 
failed to perform its constitutional obligations. 34 
In the cases 
35 
that brought this clause before the Court in the 
31The Constitution of India, Article 355. 
32The Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 4. 
33 The Constitution of Australia, Section 119. 
34 
Luther v. Borden (1848) 7 How 1. Pacific States Tel. Co. v. 
Gregon (1912) 223 U.S. 118 Eckerson v. Des Moines (1908) 137, Iowa 452. 
35Ibid 
17 
United States it was held that the maintenance of representative insti- 
tutions is sufficient to maintain a republican form of government. In 
the United States of America, if, on account of domestic violence, the 
working of the State government becomes impossible, the Union government 
may come to the aid of the State government with its military forces, if 
required--but only at the request of the State. The decision taken by 
Congress in this regard can not be challenged in a court of law. Similar- 
ly, in cases of domestic violence, it is for the Congress to determine the 
measures which should be adopted to make the guarantee effective. In 
Texas v. White, it was pointed out that the power to enforce this guarantee 
is primarily a legislative power and resides in Congress. 
36 
It has been established beyond reasonable doubts that in the United 
States if the disturbance interferes with the operation of the national 
government itself, the processes of the Federal Courts or the movement 
of the inter-state commerce, the Union may send its troops on its own initia 
tive, without waiting for the application of the State authorities. The lat 
President Kennedy sent federal troops to secure the admission of Mr. Meredit 
a negro, to the Mississippi University and thereby enforced the decree of 
the Federal Court,37 even though flouted by Governor Barnett. President 
Eisenhower also used federal troops in the Little Rock, Arkansas, integra- 
tion crisis. 
The authority to send federal troops is based on the right of the 
36 Texas v. White, 7 Wall 730 U.S. 223, 123. . 
37 In re Debs (1895) 158 U.S., 364. 
18 
Union to execute the federal laws and to maintain its authority on every 
foot of the national territory. The action of President Cleveland in 
sending federal troops during the Chicago strike in 1894 was upheld by 
the Court. In the course of the judgement, the Court observed: 
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce 
in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all 
national power . . . entrusted by the Constitution to its 
care. The strong arm of the National Government may be put 
forth to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of inter- 
state commerce or the transportation o mails.38 
Unlike the U.S.A., in India the power to intervene is granted to 
the president under the Constitution and not to the Parliament-legisla- 
ture. This doctrine of intervention can be worked by the federal govern- 
ment even if there is actually no internal disturbance or external ag- 
gression. The Constitution provides that the president should be satis- 
fied that there is danger to place or security of country. The presi- 
dent is also competent enough to insure that the government of a State 
is carried on in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The 
president has also authority under Article 365 39 read with Article 356 40 
to intervene in or to give effect to any directions issued by the Union 
41 
government under Article 256. 
The provisions of Article 356 contemplate the exercise of the 
38 In re Debs (1895) 158 U.S., p. 564. 
39The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
40 The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
41 The Constitution of India. See Appendix. 
19 
powers by the president on a report being received by him from the governor 
and, if the president acts under Article 356 in such a case, there is no- 
thing unconstitutional in his doing so, and any proclamation made by him 
42 
thereunder can not be challenged as ultra wires. 
In case the governor of a State does not reported to the president 
about the constitutional breakdown, and if the president wants to get satis- 
fied otherwise than by a governor's report, he may in his executive capacity 
appoint a commission to report on the matter of internal disturbance of the 
State or to report whether there exists conditions in which the government 
of the State can not be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. 43 
On the basis of such a report, he can receive an objective satisfaction, 
and then he may exercise his emergency powers to introduce president's rule 
in the State's administration. In case no such committee is also appointed, 
how should the president act? Should he accept and act according to the ad- 
vice tendered by the Cabinet even if the advice is partisan? 
The answers to these questions are clear if we read the Constituent 
Assembly Debates. It appears that the president should abide by the advice 
given by the Cabinet. Mr. Krishnamachari, speaking in the Constituent As- 
sembly on this issue, observed that "the whole scheme of the Constitution 
has been envisaged on the basis that the President is a Constitutional head 
42 
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44 
even though we have not put it in so many words." Alladi Krishnaswami 
Iyer has also tried to explain the position of the president in these 
words: 
The President means the Central Cabinet responsible to 
Parliament in which are representatives from various units 
which form the component parts of the federal government. 
Therefore, if the Provincial machinery fails, the Central 
Cabinet assumes the responsibility of the Provincial Cabinet. 45 
But, if we examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution, 
we arrive at an altogether different conclusion. The framers of the 
Constitution explained that they had outlined the position of the presi- 
dent on the Irish model, viz., that of an elected president acting on the 
advice of the ministers responsible to the legislature. 
46 
It may thus be 
seen that there is an intelligible difference between the intention of 
the framers of the Constitution and the language of the articles defining 
the powers and functions of the president. 
With regard to the exercise of the emergency powers no definite 
answer can be given as to whether the president would always and in all 
cases abide by the advice tendered by the Cabinet. It may, however, be 
said that the president, being head of the entire State at large, stand- 
ing outside the clash of interests, and being on oath to protect and de- 
fend the Constitution, may refuse to act according to the advice of the 
Council of Ministers if it is palpably partisan. The International 
44 C.A.D., Vol. IX, p. 150. 
45 
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Commission of Jurists in their Kerala Enquiry Committee Report observed: 
...the President occupying the responsible position that he 
does under the constitution would not merely tow the line 
with his Council of Ministers but would considerably hesitate 
to bow to the dictates of the Council and sign on the dotted 
line, if his better sense indicated an action to the con- 
trary.47 
EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION 
The proclamation of emergency due to external aggression or inter- 
nal disturbance differs from the proclamation of emergency due to the 
failure of constitutional machinery in the State. The fundamental dif- 
ference is that in the former case the right to move the Courts for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights is liable to be suspended and the State 
would be free from the limitations imposed by Article 19 
48 
of the consti- 
tution, whereas in the latter kind of emergency, the fundamental rights 
of the people remain unaffected. Secondly, in case of a proclamation of 
failure of constitutional machinery, the government of the State concerned 
would be superseded by the Union. On the other hand, in case of a procla- 
mation of emergency, the State authorities do not cease to function and 
the State governments are not superseded. 
47 
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Referring to the provisions made in the Constitution empowering 
49 
the president to suspend the fundamental rights, Mr. H. V. Kamath 
observed during the Constituent Assembly Debates: 
. . The Constitution has been founded . on what I call 
the Grand Affirmation of the Fundamental Rights. We have 
tried to build on that edifice of democracy, but I find sur- 
mounting that edifice the arch of Great Negation and 
article 359 to my mind is the Key-stone of the arch of auto- 
cratic reaction As an autocratic negation of liberty 
this article takes the palm over all other Constitutions in 
the world.50 
Commenting on the power conferred on the president to suspend 
the right to move the Courts for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, 
Mr. Saxena 
51 
said: 
When we were in jail in 1942, even though it was during 
the war, the foreign Government did not think it fit to de- 
prive us of habeas corpus. So if the power is goven to the 
President to abrogate this right, it will be a slur on our 
Constitution, and it should not be allowed to be included 
in it.52 
Also pointed out was the fact that no such provision was included 
53 
either in the Canadian or in the Australian constitutions. 
EFFECTS OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, Article I Sec. 9 (2) of the Constitution 
49 C.A.D., Vol. IX, p. 177. 
50 
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provides: "The privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus- 
pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety 
54 
may require it." 
It follows from this article that nothing short of actual invasion 
or rebellion may justify the suspension of this writ. The power to sus- 
pend the writ, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall, lies with the Con- 
gress. He said: 
If at any time the public safety should require the suspension 
of the powers vested by this act (granting jurisdiction) in the 
courts of the United States, it is for the Legislature to say so. 
The question depends on political considerations, on which the 
Legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, 
this court can only see its duty and must obey the laws.55 
During the earlier part of the Civil War, Lincoln issued proclama- 
tions suspending the writ and ordering wholesale arrests without warrants, 
detentions without trials and imprisonments without judicial convictions. 
In Ex Parte Merryman 56 Chief Justice Taney said that suspension of the 
writ was a legislative power which the president could not exercise, and 
observed that the president had "thrust aside the judicial authorities 
and officers to whom the Constitution has confided the power and duty of 
administering the laws, and substituted a military government in its place 
to be administered by military officers." 
Now it is admitted by all authorities on the American Constitution 
that the president has no power to suspend the writ without the sanction 
54 
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of Congress. And it is for the Courts to determine whether conditions 
have arisen which would justify the suspension. Thus in Ex Parte Milligan 
the Supreme Court held that a threatened invasion would not justify the 
suspension. 
It is only the writ of habeas corpus that can be suspended by the 
Legislature either during war or any other emergency. The Bill of Rights 
can be suspended only by an amendment of the Constitution.1 As observed 
57 by Mr. Justice Davis: 
The illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding 
the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited 
power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of history in-
formed them that a trial by an established court, assisted by 
an impartial jury, was the only sure way of protecting the 
citizen against oppression and wrong. Knowing this they limited 
the suspension to one great right; and left the rest to remain 
forever inviolable. But it is insisted that the safety of the 
country in time of war demands that this broad claim for martial 
law shall be sustained, that a country, preserved at the sacri-
fice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth 
the cost of preservation. 
The Court went on to add in memorable words: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers 
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the 
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more 
pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man 
than that any of its (Bill of Rights) provisions can be sus-
pended during any of the great exigencies of the Government. 
In another case the same Court held that "even war does not remove 
59 Constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." 
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Of course times have changed since the above pronouncements by 
the Supreme Court, but the words contain such a perennial truth that 
they should ever ring in the ears of men who ardently desire constitu- 
tional government. That the Court, even now, will not hesitate to apply 
the Constitution's limitations to action taken in time of the emergency 
of war and sought to be justified under the war powers may be seen from 
the Steel Seizure case 
60 
in which the Court held unconstitutional Presi- 
dent Truman's seizure of steel mills during an industrial strike in the 
midst of the Korean War on the ground that the president had invaded the 
war powers confided to Congress by the Constitution. The pronouncement 
of the Supreme Court that the Constitution of the United States applies 
in war and peace is still valid. This does not, however, mean that the 
Executive has no ample powers in times of extreme emergency. During the 
great exigencies of Government, the Courts have never hesitated to allow 
wide powers to the Executive, and have upheld as valid such executive 
and legislative action as would not be allowed in normal times by liberally 
construing the term "executive power." 
In India, it is the executive authority that is empowered to sus- 
pend constitutional guarantees in times of war as well as in times of 
61 
peace, for a proclamation under Article 352 may be made not only when 
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there is external aggression or internal disturbance, but also when there 
is "imminent danger" thereof according to the satisfaction of the presi- 
dent, which is final on this point. So, when a proclamation of emergency 
is made by the president, the citizen during the operation of emergency, 
has no protection against the legislative, executive or local authorities 
as the State is free from the limitations imposed by Article 19, which 
guarantees to the citizens the freedom of speech, the freedom of movement, 
the freedom of occupation and right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. 
Article 359 62 empowers the president to suspend the right to move the 
Court for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution. This right, it may be noted, is of great value as it 
makes the other rights workable, real and concrete as it enables any citizen 
to seek relief on remedy in the court of law. The suspension of this basic 
right will be in force during the operation of the emergency or still such 
shorter period as may be specified in the order of the president. This 
article does not specify the definite time within which the order must be 
placed before the Parliament. It does not also empower the Parliament to 
revoke the order. Viewed from this angle of vision, the powers conferred 
on the Executive, over which there is no judicial review, go far beyond 
what is actually necessary. 
PRESIDENT-CABINET RELATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Taken as a whole and on their face value, the presidential powers 
62_ 
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are formidable indeed. There is hardly any other constitution which gives 
such a long and detailed list of powers to its Chief Executive. The question, 
however, is how far all or any of these powers will be really exercised by 
him. On the answer to this question will depend the real position of the 
president in the governmental system established by the Constitution, rather 
than what may appear from a literal reading of the constitutional provisions. 
This question was discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly at 
different times and each time the point that was stressed most was the cons- 
titutional character of the head of the State. Introducing the Draft Cons- 
titution, Dr. Ambedkar, the then Law Minister, said: 
In the Draft Constitution there is placed at the head of the 
Indian Union a functionary who is called the President of the 
Union. The title of this functionary reminds one of the Presi- 
dent of the United States. But beyond identity of names there is 
nothing common between the form of government prevalent in Ameri- 
ca and the form of government proposed under the Draft Constitu- 
tion. The two are fundamentally different. Under the Presidential 
system of America, the President is the Chief head of the Execu- 
tive. The administration is vested in him. Under the Draft Cons- 
titution the President occupies the same position as the King 
under the English Constitution. He is the head of the State but 
not of the Executive. He represents the na4on but does not rule 
the nation. He is the symbol of the nation.° 
During the general discussion of the Constitution, at the concluding 
stage, T. T. Krishnamachari said: 
It has been mentioned that one of the chief defects of this 
Constitution is that we have not anywhere mentioned that the 
President is a constitutional head and the future of the Presi- 
dent's power is, therefore, doubtful . This is a matter 
which has been examined by the Drafting Committee to some extent. 
The position of the President in a responsible government is not 
the same as the position of a President under a representative 
63 
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Government like America and that is a mistake that a number 
of people in the House have been making, when they said that 
the President will be an autocrat, and no one appears to 
realise that the President has to act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister . . So far the relationship of the President 
with the Cabinet is concerned, I must say that we have, so 
to say, completely copied the system of responsible govern- 
ment that is functioning in Britain today; we have made no 
deviation from it and the deviations that we have made are 
only such as are necessary because our Constitution is 
federal in structure.64 
With this background in view, one may examine the constitutional 
provisions that deal with the relationship of the president with the 
Council of Ministers in order to see how far these claims are justified. 
Article 74 is important in this connection. It provides: 
1. There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime 
Minister at the head to aid and advise the President 
in the exercise of his functions. 
2. The question whether any, and if so what, advise was 
tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be 
inquired into any court.65 
Article 75 clarifies the position of the president. It States 
1. The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President 
and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Presi- 
dent on the advice of the Prime Minister; 
2. The Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of 
the President; 
3. The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsi- 
ble to the House of the People.66 
These provisions, taken as a whole, fairly establish the claim of 
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Ambedkar and his colleagues that the authors of the Constitution wanted 
to adopt the British pattern of Cabinet government. At the same time, 
it is also clear that they did not want to use expressions which would 
take away the flexibility that is the heart and soul of the British system. 
The difficulty of the Drafting Committee was to state precisely in a writ- 
ten constitution certain well-established constitutional conventions that 
regulate the relationship between the King and the Cabinet in Britain. 
This is why, while certain provisions convey their meaning in unmistakable 
terms, there are others that are not equally clear. Thus, it is quite clear 
that, for the exercise of his functions, there must be a Council of Minis- 
ters with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. 
But does this mean that the President is always bound by the advice of the 
Council? 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED STATES-INDIAN EMERGENCIES: SOME CASE STUDIES 
During the fifteen years of existence of the Indian nation as a 
republican form of government, there arose, more than once, occasions for 
a proclamation of emergency by the President of India. In most of the cases 
in which he proclaimed emergency and took over powers of administration 
from the State or States involved, the main reason was failure of the 
State machinery under the stress of some impending disaster, to run the 
government according to the provisions of the Constitution. These were 
semi-anarchical affairs and the elected representative of the people of the 
State who were to control and manage the House found themselves in a state 
30 
of complete helplessness, and the governor, the source of administrative 
authority representing the State Government, had to inform the president 
about the whole affair. The president, on receipt of this information, 
and having ascertained its reliability, thereupon proclaimed an emergency 
under Article 356, and assumed to himself responsibility for all the 
functions of the State administration. 
TIE PUNJAB 
The first instance of the proclamation of emergency took place, 
under Article 356, on June 20, 1951, in the Punjab where an alternative 
ministry could not be formed after the resignation of Dr. Gopichand 
Bhargava's Cabinet. The proclamation was made after the governor of 
the Punjab reported to the president that there was no constitutional 
machinery to perform the tasks entrusted to the administrators by the 
Constitution to run the democratic form of government. The president, 
thereupon, promulgated two orders under Article 356 (viz., S.R.O. 925 
and 926) 67 and took over the charge of the State. 68 
The president later on delegated all the power he assumed under 
the article of the Constitution to the governor of the State, who as 
agent of the president, carried them out. The legislative power of the 
State was given to the Parliament of the Union. The emergency, however, 
67 
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existed for a short period and Parliamentary government was re-established. 
The federal government tried its best to pave the way for re-establishment 
of Parliamentary government in the State. The president did not want to 
keep the State under his thumb for a long time and no sooner the ground 
was ready for freeing the State from presidential rule, the president with- 
drew his authority and released the State to play its role and run its 
government based on the principles of the Constitution. This shows that 
the president was not keen on keeping a unit of the federation under his 
control longer than was absolutely necessary for the welfare and good 
management of the State. 
PATIALA AND EAST PUNJAB STATE UNION 
The second occasion for the proclamation of emergency arose in 1952 
when, after the first general election, the formation of a stable ministry 
was found impossible in the PEPSU State. There was ministerial instability, 
administrative lawlessness, and growing fear of constitutional breakdown. 
There was, first of all, a Congress ministry which soon lost its majority 
in the Legislature. A coalition ministry which followed it was also not 
in a position to command a majority in the Legislature. The coalition minis- 
try had a very hard time to run the administration as there was dissension 
and conflict within the ministry itself. The Rajpramukh brought this state 
of affairs to the notice of the president. On receipt of this information, 
the President used, for the second time, the power granted to him by 
Article 356 and proclaimed emergency on March 4, 1953. This emergency 
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lasted until March 7, 1954. As a result of the proclamation, the State 
legislature was dissolved; the ministry quit the office. The president 
appointed a civil service officer as adviser to the Rajpramukh to carry 
on the administration during the emergency. The new elections were held 
within six months, and the Congress Party won a majority of the seats in 
the Legislature and formed a stable ministry. 
ANDHRA 
The third time the president utilized the powers to proclaim emer- 
gency was in 1959 on the 15th of November, under the pressure of unusual 
circumstances. The newly created Andhra State's ruling Prakasam Ministry 
was defeated on the question of prohibition by an alliance between the 
Communist and P.S.P. parties. The Prakasam Ministry was supported by 
the Congress and some independent members of the Legislature. The coali- 
tion group that passed a motion of no-confidence was a mixture of many 
ideologies and party affiliations. Naturally, it became impossible for 
the opposition parties to form a new ministry. This dilemma and dif- 
ficulty on the part of opposition parties to unite and form a new ministry 
gave rise to public unrest. The public opinion was gaining momentum for 
holding another general election to elect representatives to the Legisla- 
ture. But the defeated Prakasam Ministry was unwilling to carry on even 
as a caretaker government during the period needed for the holding of the 
new election. The governor reported to the president all about this un- 
usual political situation and on the basis of this report, the president 
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proclaimed the emergency and took over the administration of the State. 
The president's rule ended with the formation of a stable government after 
the new election in 1954. 
69 
TRAVANCORE-COCHIN 
The president in 1956 again proclaimed an emergency when the then 
Congress Ministry of the former State of Travancore-Cochin resigned as 
a result of its inability to command a majority party position in the Legis- 
lature. No other party was in a position to form an alternative ministry; 
taking over the administration of the State was the only solution left to 
the president. The emergency lasted for about a year during which the new 
State of Kerala was formed and the second general elections held. Although 
the election did not give a chance to any political party to form ministry 
on the basis of its strength in the State Legislature, yet, a coalition 
ministry was formed with the Communist and independent members of the Legis- 
lature. This made possible the restoration of parliamentary government in 
70 
the State in 1957. 
KERALA 
On the 31st of July, 1959, the president issued another proclamation 
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taking over the charge of the State administration in Kerala from the then 
Communist Ministry. This act was necessitated by the deteriorating condi- 
tions of political life in the State. The Communist Ministry, which came 
to power in April, 1957, by election, was becoming very unpopular. There 
were public agitations, strikes, and some acts of violence against the laws 
passed by the Communist-controlled Legislature. By early 1959, this popular 
unrest assumed formidable proportions. A State wide disobedience movement 
was launched against the ministry, demanding its immediate resignation from 
office. This movement produced chaos and disorder and it became particularly 
impossible for the administration to run the State. The governor of the 
State reported to the president that, after studying the situation, he had 
come to the conclusion that the administration of the State could not be 
carried on in accordance with the Constitution any longer. On this infor- 
mation from the governor, the president assumed powers to run the State. 
Here, in this case, it may be said that the Communist Ministry was still com- 
manding full support of the Legislature when the president took over the ad- 
ministration of the State. This was an unusual case in which there was no 
vote of no-confidence against the ministry nor ministerial instability was 
the problem of the time. The public unrest and popular agitations created 
a situation in which the governor had to report to the president about the 
anarchic and chaotic conditions of the State affairs. The Report of the 
Governor, a voluminous document, explained the justification for the presi- 
dent to declare emergency and take over charge of the government. 
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Recently, also, the president has exercised this power to take over 
control of State administration. The latest victim of this power is Kerala 
State where the presidential rule is still in practice. The last general 
election held a few months back could not produce any single party majority 
in the State Legislature. The result of this was that there could not be 
an opportunity for the governor to ask any party to form a ministry. This 
state of affairs paved the way for the president to run the administration 
of the State with the help of the governor of the State. 
For the first time in the history of the Indian republic, the presi- 
dent proclaimed emergency under Article 352 
72 
when the Chinese made an ag- 
gression on the northeastern border of India. This time the president is- 
sued the emergency order realizing that the safety of the nation was in 
danger because of external aggression. The emergency is still in existence 
(1965) and the president has signed several Acts, passed by the Parliament, 
to maintain law and order and to meet the Chinese threat. 
WAR POWERS: THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT 
Even though the United States Constitution speaks nothing about the 
emergency powers of the president, it does speak of the war powers of the 
president to meet the pressing demands of war. Natural or designated nation- 
al emergencies have given the opportunity to the president to use his author- 
ity in handling the affairs of some of the fields even without authorization 
72 
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from the Congress. In the past, Abraham Lincoln used the emergency of 
civil war to summarily arrest an individual and ignored Chief Justice 
Roger Taney's decision that he had no power to do so. The Chief Justice 
confessed the inability of the Court to enforce its decision. 
73 
President 
Hayes used troops to put down a railroad strike and President Cleveland 
used them again to prevent a Pullman strike. They all used this weapon 
on one pretext or another, claiming it to be in their area of authority. 
Following the inauguration of F. D. Roosevelt as President of the 
United States the use of extraordinary powers by the president came thick 
and fast. His tenure of office had a stormy history of the use of emer- 
gency powers. The measures he adopted to improve the economy of the nation 
and to meet depression caused great hardship to his administration. The 
National Recovery Act and other New Deal laws were the result of his con- 
viction of the presence of emergency to which he was entitled to meet with 
as the head of the State. The Supreme Court of the United States outlawed 
several New Deal laws, but the president went on exercising emergency powers, 
given to him by the Congress, both in times of war and peace. 
74 
President Truman, who stepped into the shoes of F. D. Roosevelt, 
followed the same argument that the president has the power to combat nation- 
al emergencies vested in him by virtue of being the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the United States. He evoked Article II, Section 2 of the 
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United States Constitution, which says that "the President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," to meet emergencies 
both existing and anticipated. Shortly after he assumed the office of the 
presidency, he asked the Congress to empower him to draft railroad workers 
into the Army in order to stall a strike. Later on, he seized coal mines 
on the grounds of war emergency. 
The most important case in which he used his power to meet national 
emergency, on the basis of his war power, deserves our attention. This study 
of his use of emergency powers will provide us materials to reach a conclusion 
about the philosophy of this source of authority to meet different problems 
in two different countries--India and the United States. This case would 
give us a chance to examine the doctrine of presidential inherent power and 
its relation to the rights of individuals and business enterprises. 
On April 18, 1952, the President of the United States, Mr. Truman, 
promulgated an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of steel industries. This was deemed necessary if the challenge 
of war was to be met. The cause of this promulgation was the failure to 
negotiate a settlement between steel industrialists and workers to provide 
enough materials needed to fight a war. The examination of the background 
of this controversial case would be of great help to us. 
In the second part of 1951, a dispute arose between the employees 
and employers of the steel companies over the question of terms and conditions 
to be included in the new bargaining agreements. Both the parties failed to 
reach a solution and to work out a compromise formula. In December, 1951, 
the representative organization of employees--United Steel Workers of 
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of America--served a notice on the employer expressing its desire to go on 
strike. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service tried to bring about 
an agreement between the parties but it failed. This failure of efforts by 
this organization resulted in the reference of this issue to the Federal 
Wage Stabilization Board by the president. The Federal Wage Board was auth- 
orized to investigate and recommend terms of settlement between the parties. 
But the Board also could not produce any effective result; it could not bring 
about a settlement. This forced forced the worker's union to call for a 
nation-wide strike commencing April 9, 1952. 
This call for a strike made the president think about the national 
defense as steel was the most important component of substantially all weap- 
ons to carry on war. This thought of indispensibility of steel and the need 
to carry on with war demands necessitated the proclamation of emergency 
ordinances by the president to take possession of and operate most of the 
steel mills throughout the country. This president sent messages to Congress 
reporting his action; Congress ignored his message. 
The companies brought procedings against the president's act and 
claimed that the seizure was not legal and valid as it was not authorized 
by an act of Congress. This claim was opposed on the grounds that any strike 
disrupting steel production would endanger the safety and well-being of the 
country and the president has an inherent power based on constitutional pro- 
visions and practices to do anything to protect the life of the nation. 
Holding against the president's act on this ground, the Supreme Court is- 
sued an order declaring void the seizure of steel industries. 
The Supreme Court said that the president's power to issue an order 
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to seize steel industries must stem either from an act of Congress or from 
the Constitution itself. There are no statutes which authorize the presi- 
dent in clear terms to take possession of private property. Nor is there 
any act of Congress to support his power to do so. Although there are 
some statutes 
75 
which do authorize the president to take both personal and 
real property under certain circumstances, yet, the president's order to 
take over steel industries has no root in those acts as the conditions to 
evoke those acts are not met. Moreover, the use of the seizure technique 
to handle labor disputes and settle them was never authorized by an congres- 
sional enactment prior to this controversy. Congress had refused to accept 
this principle as a method of solving labor problems. In 1947, Congress 
rejected an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act, authorizing seizures of 
properties in cases of emergency. 
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The Congress thought that the technique 
of seizure like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the 
process of collective bargaining. 
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The Supreme Court held that as the president has no authority to 
issue an order to seize steel industries unless the order had its root in 
the provisions of the Constitution or an act of Congress. The claim made 
by the president that to take property in order to prevent strikes comes 
under his military power as Commander in Chief, is both untrue and unrealis- 
tic. In the framework of the Constitution the main job of the president 
75 The Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 625-627, 50 
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is to see that the laws are faithfully executed. This means that he is 
not a lawmaker. It is the business of the Congress to make laws regulating 
labor disputes and all other matters, and the president's exclusive area 
is to execute them. 
78 
Thus, the Korean War, which forced the president to declare the 
existence of a national emergency on September 8, 1950, could not even 
procure to him authorities to take over private property and management. 
The Supreme Court decision settled the issue stating that no matter whatso- 
ever grave emergency the nation is facing, it does not give the president 
the right to encroach upon individual's right to property. The Supreme 
Court enunciated and upheld a principle that the seizure power should be 
attributed to the Congress rather than to the president because Congress, 
consisting of many individuals, is responsible and can be trusted. The 
president, however, is one man and hence, presumptively irresponsible and 
not to be trusted. 
79 
The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court pointed 
out in support of presidential act that the majority opinion has disre- 
garded the combined constitutional practice of all three branches of govern- 
ment since 1790. It says: 
No basis for claims of arbitrary action, unlimited powers or 
dictatorial usurpation of congressional power appears from the 
fact of this case. On the contrary, judicial, legislative and 
executive precedents throughout our history demonstrate that in 
this case the President acted in full conformity with his duties 
78 
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under the Constitution. 
But, the majority opinion expressed that the president's seizure 
was in conflict with the policy of Congress expressed in the Defense Produc- 
tion Act of 1950, and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Conse- 
quently, the president's order "violated the essence of the principle of 
81 
the separation of governmental powers." 
CHAPTER IV 
EMERGENCY POWERS: SOURCE OF DICTATORIAL AUTHORITY 
After examining the background of some emergency proclamations both 
in India and the United States, we should try to find out whether these powers, 
implied or explicit, can make the office of presidency a dictator. 
Under the Indian Constitution the office of the president appears to 
be a source of both love and fear, constitutional headship and dictatorship 
and a nominal figurehead and not real executive. It ranges from a mild 
obedient type of president to a wild, dangerous type of dictator. To study 
this unique office, we have to analyze the two dominant schools of thought 
which go to decide the role and powers of the Indian president under the 
constitutional framework. One of these may be described as a constitutional 
school which derives its source from the philosophy that Indian presidency 
is like the British Crown, a figurehead, who has to act in all cases on the 
advice of the Prime Minister. The other school may be described as the 
80 
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juristic school, which has its source in the wordings and terms of the 
written document--the Constitution of India. 
A literal reading of the provisions of the Constitution relating to 
the president may lead one to think that the president is all powerful. 
Under the Constitution, he is given all executive powers of the Union, all 
emergency powers to meet any crisis. The vast scope of emergency powers 
may make the president, in the future, a strong dictator who may destroy 
the whole structure of democratic setup in India. This unique power of the 
president that may make him an autocrat, a Hitler, has been criticized by 
a group of political thinkers and statesmen. Mr. K. T. Shas, while op- 
posing this grant of power to the president, observed in the Constituent 
Assembly that this authorization of authority to the head of the State is 
a clear sign of intellectual bankruptcy of the support of the provisions 
as these provisions would mar the progress of individual liberty and 
state's autonomous status. His words against the emergency provisions of 
the Constitution can be quoted to show his fear of the creation of a dictator- 
like president. He said: 
Coming to this grand finale and the crowning glory of this 
chapter of reaction and retrogression I find one cannot but 
notice two distinct currents of thought underlying and influ- 
encing throughout the provisions of this chapter. (1) to arm 
the Centre with special power against the units and (2) to 
arm the government against the people . Looking at all the 
provisions of this chapter particularly and scrutinising the 
powers that have been given in almost every article, it seems 
to me, the name only of liberty or democracy will remain under 
the Constitution.82 
Mr. B. Das and others expressed the opinion that the emergency 
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provisions of the Constitution of India would make the president the virtual 
head of the State. These critics pointed out that the provisions enabling 
the president to use emergency powers can very easily be compared with 
Article 48 of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic (1919) of Germany 
that gave birth to the rise of Hitler to supreme power. 83 
POWER TO DIRECT THE STATES 
The whole chapter on emergency provisions should be thoroughly ex- 
amined to find out the root of the president's opportunity to become a dic- 
tator. The effects of presidential emergency proclamations on individual 
liberties, state administration and finance may give us some ground to ex- 
amine the scope of his future position. As regards the emergency arising 
out of war or internal disturbance, the effects of presidential proclamation 
will have a wide range to cover. The articles 353, 354, 358, and 359 
84 
deal 
with the expansion of presidential authority to curb and destroy, if he de- 
signs, both federalism and democracy. 
Article 353 of the Indian Constitution deals with the effect of the 
proclamation of emergency. One effect of this proclamation will be that 
the executive power of the president can be extended to giving directions to 
any State as to the manner in which its executive power is to be exercised. 
In normal times, the president has no such wide range of authority in matters 
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of directing a State's executive. The second effect will be: 
The power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any 
matter shall include power to make laws conferring powers and 
imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and 
imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authori- 
ties of the Union as respects that matter, notwithstanding that 
it is one which is not enumerated in the Union List.85 
According to Article 354, the president shall have constitutional power to 
modify the provisions of the Constitution and lay down the allocation of 
financial relations between the Union and the States. But this authority 
will cease to operate when the emergency ceases to exist. 
Under the emergency, it appears, the president shall acquire the 
power to give directions to a State in any matter, and though the State 
government will not be suspended, it shall be under the complete control 
of the Union executive, and the administration of the country, insofar as 
the proclamation goes, will function as under a unitary system with local 
subdivision, as in Great Britain. 
POWER TO EXTEND THE LIFE OF THE PARLIAMENT 
The president may also extend the normal five years life term of the 
House of People for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not ex- 
ceeding a period of six months under any circumstances after the proclama- 
tion has ceased to operate. 
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made, the legislative competence of the Union Parliament shall be auto- 
matically widened and the limitation imposed as regards State List shall 
be removed. In other words, during the operation of emergency powers, 
Parliament shall have the power to legislate as regards to the subjects en- 
listed in the State List. Though the proclamation shall not suspend the 
State Legislature, it will suspend the distribution of legislative powers 
between the Union and the State, so far as the Union is concerned, so that 
the Union Parliament may meet the emergency by legislation over any subject 
as may be necessary, as if the Constitution were unitary. 
SUSPENSION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The most shocking provision of the Constitution relates to the sus- 
pension of the rights of the people under Article 19. 
87 
It also prohibits 
individuals to move the Court to protect them from presidential authoritative 
grip. This means that with the proclamation of emergency, various kinds of 
power will be suspended and the Judiciary will not have the right to inter- 
vene to save citizens even if their freedom is in danger or is crushed by 
the president. The peculiarity of the provisions relating to the suspension 
of fundamental right is that no distinction is made between times of war and 
times of peace, for a proclamation under Article 352 
88 
may be made even in 
cases of external aggression or internal disturbance and also not only when 
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they have actually taken place, but also when there is imminent danger ac- 
89 
cording to the president's satisfaction, which is final on this point. 
Here it would not be out of place to say that in England, the execu- 
tive has no emergency powers except under Parliamentary authority. There 
is no prerogative of the Crown to make a proclamation of emergency. But 
while the principles of Parliamentary Sovereignty and Rule of Law are kept 
unimpaired even in times of war, Parliament itself endows the executive with 
authority to arrest without trial suspected persons by passing such acts as 
the Defense of Realm Act, 1914, and the Emergency Power (Defense) Act, 
1939. 
90 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
The president, after he declares a financial emergency, may be able 
to bring the States of the Union under his thumb as the Constitution pro- 
vides the right to direct them to follow certain rules concerning finance. 
He can issue directions for the reduction of salaries of a or any class of 
employees serving the State, including the Judges of the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts. 
CAN THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA BECOME A DICTATOR? 
Thus, we notice that the effects of presidential proclamation of 
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89 
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emergency can be both devastating and destructive. The president's power 
declaring an emergency is a powerful weapon and a constitutional one to 
make the office strong and forceful. There has always been vigorous and 
continuous attacks on the president's authority to deprive individuals of 
their freedom and expelling the Judiciary to come to the rescue of freedom- 
deprived people. Mr. H. V. Karmath, speaking in the Constituent Assembly, 
said that by providing these powers to the president, the Constitution has 
tried to create "a State where the rights and liberties of millions of in- 
nocent men and women will be in continuous jeopardy, a State where if there 
be peace, it will be the peace of the grave and the void of the desert."91 
The suspension of freedoms under Article 19 and the provision to 
move the court for enforcement of rights attract our attention in studying 
the scope of the Indian president's ability to become a dictator. Article 19 
may be called the modern version of the Bill of Rights or a summary of "The 
Magna Carta." If it is taken out of the Constitution, there would be prac- 
tically nothing to prove the existence of the concept of liberty. The sus- 
pension of the article by the president would kill the very nature of democracy 
which has its roots in the doctrine of individual freedom. During the debate 
in the Constituent Assembly, the ill-effect of this authorization was pointed 
out to the president by a number of members of the House. As S. L. Saksena 
said, "if the power is given to the President to abrogate this right, it will 
be a slur on our Constitution . ." 
92 
It may be noted here that we do not 
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find any mention of such tremendous power to any head of State in any coun- 
try including the United States, Canada, Australia and England. It was 
said about Article 359 which provides right to the president to suspend 
Article 19, "as an autocratic negation of liberty." 
93 
"This article," 
says Mr. Kamath, "takes the palm over all other Constitutions in the world 
. . A general authorisation of this kind for restricting individual free- 
dom has no parallel anywhere else." 94 
CAN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BECOME A DICTATOR? 
If we examine the workings of the office of the American presidency 
in recent years, we may find some seeds of dictatorship in the making. Al- 
though these seeds have not got a good supply of water from the Constitution 
to grow yet, they have enough authoritarian flavor in them. The most im- 
portant factors that may go to make the President of the United States a 
dictator, it is said, is its ability to command a vast range of power--a 
range which is developing every day. It is assumed that a president with a 
pliant Congress can assume dictatorial authority and command immense power 
in the United States. 
The so-called path towards dictatorship of presidency is being marked by 
the increasing dependence of people on the actions and policies of the White 
House. Workers look to the president for emoluments of wages, farmers for 
fixation of prices, businessmen for loans to start new enterprises or pro- 
tection or expansion of existing ones. Old people, widows and orphans see 
in the presidency the image of a philantropic institution. The presidency 
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appears all the more imposing because it is the center of expectations. Just 
as he is to the Sioux Indians, the president is in a sense the Great Father 
to the American people. They look to him because he has unlimited power 
to make proposals for action. He can espouse any cause and whatever he says 
will be heard and noticed. 
95 
The appearance of presidential power is en- 
hanced by the color and pageantry of the office, the adoptation to American 
96 
needs of the monarchial principle. The president reigns as well as rules. 
The critics of the office of presidency point out that the real opportun- 
ity for eventual dictatorship in the United States may be found in the stead- 
ily increasing centralization of power in Washington. These critics observe 
that until the 1930's, the power of government in Washington was strictly a 
limited power. The great reservoir of power lay in individual states. Until 
that time too, the power of the purse, as that power was exercised by Washing- 
ton, was limited. Federal aid to states was generally limited to road building, 
river and harbor development, land-grand colleges and a few irrigation projects. 
P.ut, today, the circumstances have changed and the states are depending on the 
Federal Government for aid and assistance in a host of functions. "The Presi- 
dent, in short, is the one-man distillation of the American people . ."97 
which may encourage the man in office to assume enormous power and command all 
sorts of authority. 
But criticism out forward doesn't hold any ground in reality. The American 
president is checked by the opinion of the people in general or when they organ- 
ize, by their pressure groups. The president gets his way by begging for help. 
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The states are increasing their participation in and contribution to domes- 
tic programs faster than the central government. From an economic point of 
view also during the past ten years, the central government has lost its 
superior influence. Thus, we can say that the President of the United States, 
like the President of India, is not likely to become a dictator other than by 
total war and/or abrogation of the Constitution. 
INABILITY OF TEE INDIAN PRESIDENT TO BECOME A DICTATOR 
All these fears, both about the Indian and the United States presi- 
dents, are serious in nature and spirit. Nevertheless, looking back and 
examining the record carefully, one may feel that these fears are the result 
of an overcritical study of the presidency. The role of the President of 
India can be understood if we carefully read the debates of the Constituent 
Assembly on this subject. The severe attack made on the floor of the Constit- 
uent Assembly and the dangerous results of the emergency power have now lost 
their strength and value to a great extent after the working of the consti- 
tution for fifteen years. The main fear over these powers of the president 
is that he would destroy the federal character of the Union, take over all 
powers of the Union and States in his hand, and behave like an autocrat; this 
assumption of power will make the philosophy of freedom a mere farce and 
democratic principle a nightmare. 
To reach a conclusion of this topic we have to examine the strength 
of fears hovering in the minds of students of the Indian Constitution. This 
is a truth that the president during the operation of emergency might be able 
51 
to transform the federal nature of the polity into a unitary one, but this 
is not a peculiar right that he alone commands in the world. This right, 
in one way or another, is being commanded by almost all the heads of States 
under federal constitutions. For the maintenance of national security and 
safety of the people, the Constitution has provided this power to the presi- 
dent. Thus, the presidential authority to take over the administration of 
the whole Indian republic is a result of abundant caution. As Mr. Ambedkar, 
the then Law Minister said: 
For it is only the Centre which can work for a common 
purpose and for general interests of the country as a whole. 
Herein lies the justification for giving to the Centre certain 
overriding powers to be used in an emergency. And after all, 
what is the obligation imposed upon the constituent states by 
these emergency powers? No more than this, that in an emergency, 
they should take into consideration along side their own local 
interests, the opinion and interests of the nation as a whole.98 
Students of Indian history know that India had to suffer in the past 
because of weak central authority unable to face unexpected aggression and 
revolt of States against the Centre. The present day history also speaks 
that there exists many disruptive forces which may go to destroy national 
unity and endanger public peace and security. This historical background 
and present day need necessitates a strong executive who could be able to 
handle any situation and save unity of nation even at the cost of destroying 
the federal feature temporarily. This provision in the Constitution, in the 
opinion of many, is the need of time and practical in approach. It does not 
make the president a potential destroyer of federalism, rather it empowers 
him to face grave situations with boldness and a strong hand. During the 
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the debate in the Constituent Assembly, this point was made clear by 
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmed in these words: 
This is the most important provision in the Constitution. . . 
I submit that we must take not a theoretical view of the affair, 
but rather a practical view. I submit that there are real dangers 
threatening the internal peace of the country, apart from the fear 
of external aggression . There are many dangers lurking in the 
way of the establishment and maintenance of democracy in this coun- 
try. There are forces of disintegration and disorder already visi- 
ble everywhere.99 
Mr. Ambedkar frankly admitted on the floor of the Constituent As- 
sembly that the articles of emergency powers of the president should never 
be called into operation and the nature of federation should all the time 
100 
come, be maintained and preserved. But to Mr. Krishnamachari, the 
present Finance Minister of India, it appears that "these emergency pro- 
visions have got to be tolerated as a necessary evil and without these 
provisions, it is well nigh possible that all our efforts to frame a Cons- 
titution may ultimately be jeopardised." 101 
As to the problem of the President of India becoming a dictator, we 
have to examine the limitations--both legal and moral--of this office in 
detail. Those who find in the provisions of the Constitution a very com- 
fortable position for the president to change from constitutional head to 
real head, have to take certain facts into consideration. Though it may 
appear that the Constitution of India provides an American type of presi- 
dential government, in reality, it is a British-Parliamentary type of 
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constitution. 
102 
Like the Crown of British Constitution, the president 
is a nominal head of the administration. He is the head of the State and 
the ceremonial chief who will behave like the Crown under the British system 
of government, in exercising the powers conferred upon him by the constitu- 
tion. His position and function would be the same as those of the British 
King who acts on the advice of his cabinet. It is India's dislike and disap- 
proval of a Monarchy that led to the provision of an elected president in- 
stead of an heriditary King. The main reason of his unlimited grant of cons- 
titutional power depends on the dictum that he will not use them to destroy 
the edifice of democracy. He will lead the nation and guide the ministry 
in time of crisis with the powers he is entitled to use as being the head 
of the State. 
An objective assessment of the evidence is persuasive that the chances 
of the president becoming a Hitler, a Caesar, or a Tsar are almost nil. Even 
if he decides to become an autocrat, by declaring an emergency and even act- 
ing without the ministry, it seems impossible for him to carry on the adminis- 
tration without the sanction of the Parliament. He can not run the govern- 
ment without money and the right to appropriate funds lies under the area of 
Parliament's authority. There is no provision in the Constitution that can 
give authority to the president to appropriate money without Parliament's 
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approval. Hence, we find that the president, if he chooses to be an auto- 
crat, may carry his rule, at the most, through the current financial year; 
to run the administration any further would need Parliamentary support in 
the form of financial appropriations. This means that the president is very 
much handicapped by the powers of Parliament, and this should dispel fear 
that the president can ever assume the role of a dictator. There can hardly 
be an occasion when he can administer and rule the country without the ad- 
vice of a Council of Ministers. To imagine that the president and the 
cabinet would combine together to flout the Constitution by maintaining a 
perpetual emergency and dissolving the House of People everytime it comes 
into being or extending the life of an existing favorable Parliament, is 
103 
only a fear born out of mistrust and misconception of democracy itself. 
The truth that the president would head the State as a titular head 
has been accepted during the debates in the Constituent Assembly. Emphasiz- 
ing this fact, Mr. Alladi said: 
The President means the Central Cabinet responsible to 
Parliament in which are representatives from various units which 
form the component parts of the Federal government. Therefore, 
the provincial machinery having failed, the Central Cabinet as- 
sumes the responsibility instead of the Provincial Cabinet. 104 
The president's right to suspend the fundamental rights of the people 
has evoked great suspicion in the design of the Constitution itself. In the 
United States, the power is vested in the Congress. The American president 
has an ad interim power to suspend fundamental rights, but the Supreme Court 
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can declare presidential and congressional action void if it feels that 
it is unjustified under the circumstances. In Britain, the British Emer- 
gency Power Act, 1920, clearly says that an emergency proclamation must be 
laid down before Parliament within five days of its issue and would cease to 
operate after seven days if Parliament does not approve of it. 
105 
The conflicting opinions which figured in the Constituent Assembly 
on this authority of the president could not be reconciled. In the interest 
of the safety of the nation, the constitution-makers provided this right 
to the president. Mr. Alladi Krishnaswamy Aiyer pointed out in the Constit- 
uent Assembly that: 
A war can't be fought on the principle of the Magna Carta. 
Freedom of speech, right of assembly and other rights have to be 
secured in times of peace, but if only the State exists and if 
the security of the State is guaranteed. Otherwise, all these 
rights cannot exist.N° 
The provision for the suspension of constitutional rights does not 
mean that all the fundamental rights would cease to exist automatically, 
with a mere proclamation of emergency. There may be an emergency in the 
country and the president may not like to suspend the fundamental rights of 
the people. Even if the president decides to suspend the fundamental rights 
of citizens, his orders must be placed before the Parliament which is free 
to approve or disapprove it. 
THE PARLIAMENT - -A GREAT CHECK ON THE PRESIDENT 
Thus, we see that in India the scope for the president to become a 
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dictator by use of emergency powers appears to be limited and dim. The 
Parliament, with its vast range of power, is capable to frustrate any move 
of the president to rise as a dictator. The Cabinet that commands majority 
role in the Parliament-Lower House will also exercise its influence to 
check an ambitious president to grow powerful. The Indian President, un- 
like the American President, is free from judicial review of his decision 
regarding the use of emergency powers, yet he is under the pressure of pub- 
lic opinion and moral obligation to protect the Constitution both in form 
and spirit. 
In short, we can say that during a period of emergency, the executive 
becomes unusually powerful in any form of government--federal or unitary. 
The powers of the American President, the chief executive of a supposedly 
weak federation, during the two world wars were enormous. This is in spite 
of the fact that there exists in the United States in practice the doctrine 
of separation of powers. In contrast, there is in India a parliamentary 
system in which the executive, because of its command over the legislature, 
becomes both the chief legislator and the chief executive. But this does 
not mean that the Parliament becomes a slave in the hands of the executive, 
rather it behaves as a vigilant and conscious power to control executive 
from becoming an autocrat. Emergency powers granted to the president do not 
mean that he is above the Parliament. As Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari points 
out: 
The Parliament has always the right to call the Executive to 
order; and if they find that the Executive had exceeded their powers 
in regards to the operation of any of the provisions enacted under 
the emergency laws, they can always pull them up.107 
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It may be said that the president may dissolve the House of People 
and make it incapable of discussing the emergency measures, but such action 
can almost put off the discussion to a maximum of six to eight months. Even 
if the House is dissolved, the proclamation of emergency will have to be 
laid before the Council of States--the representatives of the States--within 
two months and if the Council does not approve, the proclamation becomes 
invalid. 
108 
This indeed is an effective check on any president bent upon 
creating an imaginary emergency and becoming a dictator. In this case, we 
may say that "it is not correct to compare the emergency provisions with 
either Section 102 or Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1953. The 
President, acting under a democratic constitution, can not be compared with 
109 
the Governor-General acting under British rule." The Governor-General 
under the Government of India Act, 1935, was also empowered to proclaim 
emergency in case the security of India was endangered and could ". . . 
make laws for a Province or any part thereof, with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List . . 
110 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we feel that the emergency provisions in the Indian 
Constitution have given to the president a powerful weapon by which he can 
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either protect or destroy the elements of democracy in the Constitution. 
Although we have found in research that the president can not succeed in 
becoming a constitutional dictator, yet it can not be denied that there is 
a chance of his gaining power through these provisions. Mr. B. N. Rau 
asserts that the president has not been put under any legal obligation to 
adhere to the advice of his ministers. 111 This forces us to inquire whether 
it was necessary to put the provisions of emergency powers in the Constitu- 
ti on. 
IS THERE ANY NEED FOR INCORPORATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS 
IN THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF A STATE? 
The need for constitutional incorporation of emergency powers of the 
head of the State has become urgent in the past few years. The working of 
constitutions of the United States, Canada, Australia, England and some 
other western democratic countries has given strength to the idea of putting 
down in clear terms the powers of the head of the executive, especially dur- 
ing abnormal times. In England, which has an unwritten constitution, we 
find various parliamentary enactments (i.e., Emergency Powers Act 1920, 
the Defense of Realm Act 1939) giving wide powers to the executive to meet 
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clear grant of authority to the executive for maintenance of "peace, order 
and good government" during the time of crisis. The Dominion Parliament 
under the Canadian Constitution gets power to legislate for the whole of 
Canada. In the Commonwealth of Australia Act there is a grant of powers 
to the federal executive to protect every State against invasion or against 
domestic violence. 
113 
Although there is no similar specific emergency 
provision in the Constitution of the United States, yet the Congress can 
grant the executive power to meet any challenge and to face any emergency. 
This shows that there is a tendency at least in modern governments 
to provide the executive with enough power to deal with any abnormal 
situation arising out of aggression or internal disturbance of any nature. 
In modern times the abnormalties of political situations and the need to 
deal with them go together. Due to international bickerings, internal group 
dissatisfaction, racial, language, religious and economic problems, the ad- 
ministration of all modern countries has become extraordinarily complex. 
To save the nation from any unforeseen calamity and administrative 
collapse, due to a sudden change of situation or a reversal of fortunes, 
there should be a final authority vested in some key official. The 
executive is the most appropriate office for this. It is a fact that this 
authority in the hands of the executive may provide an opportunity for him 
to ignore the principle of separation of powers and to exercise his dis- 
cretion rather freely. But one can not ignore the practical aspect of the 
incorporation of emergency powers in modern times, when a nation's political 
stability is always in danger. Particularly in the new nations of Asia and 
113 
Section 51, The Commonwealth of Australia Act. 
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Africa, which are exposed to many new problems--political, social, economic- - 
it is most necessary to put everything in the constitution in clear terms 
to avoid ambiguity and confusion. This will minimize the chance of delayed 
action by the authorities vested with such powers. A written constitution 
is, after all, designed to prescribe in unambiguous language the powers 
and functions of different offices so as to reduce the chances of conflict 
between them. 
Dr. Ambedkar was an outstanding advocate of incorporation of emer- 
gency powers in a written constitution and confidently recommended its 
inclusion. While introducing the emergency provision in the Constituent 
Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar said: 
. . The reason for its inclusion in our Constitution is that 
in the U.S.A., such legislation was challenged and declared un- 
constitutional by the Supreme Court with the result that after 
such declaration by the Court, the President could hardly do 
anything which he wanted to do under the provisions of the 
National Recovery Act. A similar fate perhaps might overwhelm 
our President if he were to grapple with a similar financial 
and economic emergency. In order to prevent such difficulty, we 
thought it was much better to make an express provision in the 
Constitution itself d that is the reason why this article has 
been brought forth.1 
HAVE EMERGENCY POWERS BEEN USED WITH CAUTION OR CARELESSLY? 
To answer this question may require a background history of the office 
of the presidency in modern times. The vagueness of some constitutional 
grants of power to the president has always furnished matter for comment, 
114 
C.A.D., Vol. X, p. 361. 
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sometimes favorable, sometimes otherwise, depending on the commentator's 
bias. 
115 
In American constitutional history, use of this power has many 
times been upheld by the Supreme Court. On several occasions it has been 
declared void, but this does not mean that these powers, when granted by 
the Congress, have been used carelessly and without any aim in mind. For 
example, in 1942, when the Congress and the president were in agreement 
that the Japanese-Americans were a threat to the security of the nation, 
the president was using his powers with a definite objective in mind--to 
protect the sovereignty and units of the country. In the Koremantsu Case, 
116 
the Supreme Court accepted the president's definition of emergency and 
endorsed the executive's act. This means that the president in the United 
States has tried to use his authorities to achieve some public good and also 
with caution. Although in the Steel Seizure Case, the Supreme Court opined 
that the president's ground for using his war power was not justified, yet, 
it may be said that "the President, in the U.S.A., can on the basis of his 
inherent power seize an industry if an emergency exists, and an emergency 
exists if the President is successful in his exercise of his prerogative." 
117 
In more than a hundred years of history, it has never been established that 
any American president has ever used the war power to gain dictatorial 
position. As a matter of fact, there has not been a single instance of a 
president actually taking prerogative action in a crisis against the wishes 
of Congress, with the exception of the seizure of the steel industry. 
118 
115Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1737 (New 
York: New York University Press, Inc., 1957), p. 306. 
116Koremantsu v. U.S., (1944) 320 U.S., 214. 
117Johnson, 22, cit., p. 349. 
118Ibid., P. 351. 
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The Indian President, with a short constitutional history of just 
over fifteen years, has evoked the emergency provisions more than once. 
The reasons have been political instability of the Ministry in one of the 
States or external aggression. Most frequently the president has used his 
authority on the report of the governor. The reports of the governor satis- 
fied the president of the need of proclamation of emergency. The president's 
acts in some cases have been criticized by political thinkers, especially 
by opposition leaders. The president's proclamation of emergency in Andhra 
was criticized on the ground that it was the duty of the governor to call 
upon the opposition party leader to form a government and that a resort to 
presidential rule would have been justified only if an alternative government 
was impossible. But the presidential rule in Andhra can be defended on the 
grounds that there was no party in the State which could claim a majority 
and a coalition between two different ideological groups would not be a good 
idea and also a general election was due in three months. The situation 
supported the president's position that an impartial administration was needed 
for the benefit of the State. 
119 
On another occasion, the genuineness of the 
president's action in using his emergency powers to rescue a State from cons- 
titutional breakdown, aroused doubts in the public mind. The occasion was 
dismissal of Kerala's Communist Ministry which had a majority in State Legis- 
lature, and the president took over the administration. But this act of the 
president was not rash or without an end in view. The report of the governor 
revealed to the president that the government had lost the support of the 
majority of the people of the State. 
Thus, it can be very safely said, that the president both in the United 
119 Rajya Sabha Debates, d. 29-11-59. 
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States and in India, have used their powers--explicit and implied--for the 
maintenance of law and order and promotion of the common good. There has 
never been an occasion in India when the president has taken recourse to 
the emergency provisions to enlarge his range of influence or power. All 
of his decisions to proclaim emergency were based on the advice of the 
Prime Minister. 
HAS THIS POWER BROUGHT ANY EFFECTIVE CHANGES IN THE OFFICE? 
The words of Corwin, "Taken by and large, the history of the Presi- 
dency has been a history of aggrandizement," 120 reflect the growing change 
in the nature of the office in the United States in recent years. But 
these words of Corwin can equally be applied to the Indian Presidency also. 
During the past few years there has been a tremendous change in the 
dimensions of this office. 
The great accession to Presidential power in recent decades 
has, however, taken place in the internal equally with the ex- 
ternal field of government, and has been signalized by the break- 
down of the two great structural principles of the American Cons- 
titutional System, the doctrine of dual federalism and the doc- 
trine of the Separation of Powers. . The replacement of the 
laissez-faire theory of government with the idea that government 
should make itself an active, reforming office in the field of 
economic enterprise . has long since come to transcend State 
lines. 121 
The Congress has also contributed to this rapid change by entrusting to the 
president powers which traditionally the Congress itself had exercised. 
120 
Edward C. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (Claremont, 
California: Claremont Colleges, 1941), p. 306. 
12 lIbid., pp. 306 & 313. 
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But it can be said that the American President faces a hard problem 
in translating his will into action. This is mainly because of his lack 
of actual control over bureaucracy. The Indian President, on the contrary, 
has no such problem and can govern the nation through a Ministry responsi- 
ble to the Parliament and a permanent civil service in case of emergency. 
Though there is an experienced civil service to execute the orders of the 
president, yet the president has not been allowed to have direct communi- 
122 
cation with the head of the various departments of administration. The 
Indian Presidency has also not been able to acquire enough ground to show 
his authority as the supreme commander in chief. 
But the Indian Presidency has clearly exerted itself in upholding 
its voice in matters of public concern. During the fifteen years of its 
life, the Indian Presidency, on many occasions, has differed with the Prime 
123 
Minister's office. The President of India had also exercised his power 
of veto in respect of the Patiala and East Punjab State Union Appropriation 
124 
Bill, passed by the Parliament in 1954. These differences of opinion 
between the president and the ministry and the acceptance of the president's 
wishes go to show that this office is not a true copy of the British Crown-- 
it has some distinguishing features. 
125 
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A. V. Sharma and N. M. Valecha, "The Indian President," 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 33 (January-March, 1962), pp. 64-65. 
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THE FUTURE OF INDIAN PRESIDENCY 
Until recently, the history of the presidency in India is the history 
of one man in office. The second president, Dr. S. Radhakrishnam, is now 
serving in his first term. The first president, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, was 
one of the makers of modern India and was the President of the Constituent 
Assembly which framed the Constitution of India--the fundamental laws of 
the nation. 
President Rajendra Prasad's faith in the parliamentary system and 
his desire to adhere to the principles of the British Constitution gave a 
smooth sailing to the Indian administrative setup. The present president, 
with a strong Prime Minister to aid and advise him, is also going along 
with the doctrine of Cabinet Government. But there are possibilities of 
a change of situations--political, social, economic and cultural--in the 
future because of the rise of strong opposition parties and a change in 
the outlook of the people. 
In that case, it may be said, the president in the future will not 
be an impartial constitutional head of the State like the British Crown. 
Rather he will be the leader of the political party he represents and will 
act in a partisan manner much as the President of the United States does. 
It may not be ruled out that if, at the federal government level, no single 
party gets a majority in Parliament to form a Ministry, the position of the 
president will become more powerful and influential. He may exploit the 
situation to take over powers in his hands by appointing a man of his choice 
as Prime Minister. 
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But such a situation as that suggested above may not come to pass 
in the foreseeable future. By the time the Indian States get different 
parties to compete for control of the administration, and multiple parties 
at the center to compete for control in Parliament, there should be some 
well-established conventions to guide the president and a very strong public 
opinion to work as a check on the president's personal ambitions. 
It is very difficult to predict the future of the presidency in 
India with confidence, yet one can be sure of the fact that the office is 
being shaped in the British pattern at present. 
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APPENDIX 
ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
Article 19: 
(1) All citizens shall have the right- - 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(c) to form associations or unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; 
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and 
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, 
trade or business. 
(2) Nothing in subclause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation 
of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far 
as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public 
order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defama- 
tion or incitement to an offence. 
(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the 
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the 
State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause. 
(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the op- 
eration of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State 
from making any law imposing, in the interests of public order or moral- 
ity, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the 
said sub-clause. 
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall 
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or pre- 
vent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on 
the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either 
in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the in- 
terests of any Scheduled Tribe. 
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the op- 
eration of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State 
from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, rea- 
sonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall af- 
fect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, prevent 
the State from making any law relating to,-- 
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for 
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, 
trade or business, or 
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or 
controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry 
or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, 
of citizens or otherwise. 
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Article 20 (3): 
(3) No person accused of any offense shall be compelled to be a wit- 
ness against himself. 
Article 22 (4)-(7): 
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the 
detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless- - 
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have 
been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of 
a High Court has reported before the expiration of the 
said period of three months that there is in its opin- 
ion sufficient cause for such detention: 
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall auth- 
orise the detention of any person beyond the maximum 
period prescribed by law made by Parliament under sub- 
clause (b) of clause (7); or 
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions 
of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and 
(b) of clause (7). 
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under 
any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the 
order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds 
on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest op- 
portunity of making a representation against the order. 
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any 
such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such 
authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe- - 
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of 
cases in which, a person may be detained for a period 
longer than three months under any law providing for pre- 
ventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Ad- 
visory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub- 
clause (a) of clause (4); 
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or 
classes of cases be detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention; and 
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an in- 
quiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4). 
Article 23 (1): 
(1) Traffic in human beings and and begar and other similar forms of 
forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall 
be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
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Article 83: 
(1) The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolution, but 
as nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as 
soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance 
with the provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law. 
(2) The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue 
for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no long- 
er and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as 
a dissolution of the House: 
Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency 
is in operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exce- 
eding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period 
of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate. 
Article 207: 
(1) A Bill or amendment making provision for any of the matters 
specified in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of clause (1) of Article 199 shall 
not be introduced or moved except on the recommendation of the Governor, 
and a Bill making such provision shall not be introduced in a Legislative 
Council: 
Provided that no recommendation shall be required under this clause 
for the moving of an amendment making provision for the reduction or 
abolition of any tax, 
(2) A Bill or amendment shall not be deemed to make provision for any 
of the matters aforesaid by reason only that it provides for the imposi- 
tion of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment 
of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it 
provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regula- 
tion of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes. 
(3) A Bill which, if enacted and brought into operation, would involve 
expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of a State shall not be passed by a 
House of the Legislature of the State unless the Governor has recommended 
to that House the consideration of the Bill. 
Article 256: 
The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure 
compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which 
apply in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to 
the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government 
of India to be necessary for that purpose. 
Article 352: 
(1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists where- 
by the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, 
whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by 
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Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect. 
(2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1) -- 
(a) may be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation; 
(b) shall be laid before each House of Parliament; 
(c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months 
unless before the expiration of that period it has been 
approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament; 
Provided that if any such Proclamation is issued at a time when the 
House of the People has been dissolved or the dissolution of the House 
of the People takes place during the period of two months referred to 
in sub-clause (c), and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has 
been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to 
such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the 
expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at 
the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the 
People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration 
of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclama- 
tion has been also passed by the House of the People. 
(3) A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India 
or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by exter- 
nal aggression or by internal disturbance may be made before the actual 
occurrence of war or of any such aggression or disturbance if the Presi- 
dent is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof. 
Article 353: 
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, then- - 
(a) notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the executive 
power of the Union shall extend to the giving of direct- 
ions to any State as to the manner in which the executive 
power thereof is to be exercised; 
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any mat- 
ter shall include power to make laws conferring powers and 
imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers 
and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers 
and authorities of the Union as respects that matter, not- 
withstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the 
Union List. 
Article 354: 
(1) The President may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in opera- 
tion, by order direct that all or any of the provisions of articles 268 to 
279 shall for such period, not extending in any case beyond the expiration 
of the financial year in which such Proclamation ceases to operate, as may 
be specified in the order, have effect subject to such exceptions or modi- 
fications as he thinks fit. 
(2) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as soon as may be after it 
is made, be laid before each House of Parliament. 
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Article 356: 
(1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor or 
Rajpramukh of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has 
arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by 
Proclamation- - 
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Govern- 
ment of the State and all or any of the powers vested in 
or exercisable by the Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case 
may be, or any body or authority in the State other than 
the Legislature of the State; 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall 
be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; 
(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear 
to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the ob- 
jects of the Proclamation, including provisions for sus- 
pending in whole or in part the operation of any provis- 
ions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority 
in the State: 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the 
President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in 
or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or 
in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution 
relating to High Courts. 
(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent 
Proclamation. 
(3) Every Proclamation under this article shall be laid before each 
House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking 
a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months 
unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolu- 
tions of both Houses of Parliament: 
Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revok- 
ing a previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the Peo- 
ple is dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People take place 
during the period of two months referred to in this clause, and if a resolu- 
tion approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, 
but not resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the 
House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation 
shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on 
which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless be- 
fore the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving 
the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. 
(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate 
on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the passing of 
the second of the resolutions approving the Proclamation under clause (3): 
Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance 
in the force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of Parliament, 
the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further per- 
iod of six months from the date on which under this clause it would other- 
wise have ceased to operate, but no such Proclamation shall in any case re- 
main in force for more than three years: 
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Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of People 
takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution ap- 
proving the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed 
by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to the continu- 
ance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the 
People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate 
at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the 
People first sits after its constitution unless before the expiration of 
said period of thirty days a resolution approving the continuance in force 
of the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. 
Article 358: 
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in Article 
19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make 
any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the 
provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take, but any 
law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect 
as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things 
done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect. 
Article 359: 
(1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President 
may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement 
of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the or- 
der and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the 
rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in 
the order. 
(2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the whole or any part of 
the territory of India. 
(3) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as soon as may be after 
it is made, be laid before each House of Parliament. 
Article 365: 
Where any State has failed to comply with, or to give effect to, any 
directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the Union under 
any of the provisions of this Constitution, it shall be lawful for the 
President to hold that a situation has arisen in which the Government of 
the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. 
Article 368: 
An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the intro- 
duction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when 
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the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership 
of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the mem- 
bers of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the 
President for his assent and upon such assent being given to the Bill, 
The Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of 
the Bill: 
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in -- 
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 
241, or 
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of 
Part XI, or 
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or 
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or 
(e) the provisions of this article, 
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of 
not less than one-half of the States specified in Parts A and B of the 
First Schedule by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures 
before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the 
President for assent. 
EMERGENCY ORDERS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
S.R.O. 925: 
Whereas I, Rajendra Prasad, President of India, have received a report 
from the Governor of the State of Punjab and am satisfied that a situation 
has arisen in which the Government of that State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India; 
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 356 . . . 
and of all other powers enabling me in that behalf, I hereby- - 
(a) assume to myself as President of India all functions of the 
Government of the said State and all powers vested in or exercisable by 
the Governor of that State; 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the said State 
shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and 
(c) make the following incidental and consequential provisions 
which appear to me to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the 
objects of this Proclamation, namely:-- 
(i) in the exercise of the functions and powers assumed to him- 
self by virtue of clause (a) of this Proclamation, it shall be lawful for 
the President to act to such extent as he thinks fit through the Governor 
of the said State; 
(ii) the operation of the following provisions of the Constitution 
in relation to that State is hereby suspended, namely:- - 
so much of clause (2) of Article 151 as relates to the laying of 
reports before the Legislature of the State, Articles 163 and 
164, clause (3) and (4) of Article 166, Articles 167 and 169, 
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Articles 174 to 186 (both inclusive), clause (3) of Article 
187 so far as it requires consultation with the Speaker of 
the Legislative Assembly, Articles 188 and 189, Articles 193 
to 198 (both inclusive), Articles 200 and 201, so much of 
clause (3) of Article 202 as relates to salaries and allow- 
ances of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the Legisla- 
tive Assembly, Articles 208 to 212 (both inclusive), the pro- 
vision to clause (1) and the provision to clause (3) of Art- 
icle 213, so much of clause (2) of Article 323 as relates to 
the laying of the report with a memorandum before the Legis- 
lature of the State, Article 382, Article 384, and paragraphs 
6 and 8 of the Second Schedule; 
(iii) while this Proclamation is in force, it shall, notwithstand- 
ing anything in any law relating to elections, be unnecessary for an elec- 
tion to be held for the purpose of filling any casual vacancy in the Legis- 
lative Assembly of the State; 
(iv) any reference in the Constitution to the Governor shall in 
relation to the said State be construed as a reference to the President, 
and any reference therein to the Legislature or Legislative Assembly of 
the State shall, in so far as it relates to the functions and powers there- 
of, be construed as a reference to Parliament, and in particular, the ref- 
erences in Article 213 to the Governor and to the Legislature or Legisla- 
tive Assembly of the State shall be construed as references to the Presi- 
dent and to Parliament respectively: 
Provided that nothing herein shall affect the provisions of Art- 
icle 153, Articles 155 to 159 (both inclusive), Article 299 and paragraphs 
1 to 4 (both inclusive) of the Second Schedule, or prevent the President 
from acting under sub-clause (i) of this clause to such extent as he thinks 
fit through the Governor of the said State; 
(v) any reference in the Constitution to Acts or laws of, or mode 
by, the Legislature of the State shall be construed are including a refer- 
ence to Acts or laws made, in exercise of the powers of the Legislature 
of the State, by Parliament by virtue of this Proclamation, or by the Presi- 
dent or other authority referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art- 
icle 357 of the Constitution, and the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 (Pun- 
jab Act 1 of 1898) and so much of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), 
as applies to State laws, shall have effect in relation to any such Act or 
law as if it were an Act of the Legislature of the State. 
S.R.O. 926: 
In pursuance of sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of the Proclamation issued 
on this the 20th day of June, 1951, by the President under Article 356 of 
the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to direct that all the 
functions of the Government of the State of Punjab and all the powers vest- 
ed in or exercisable by the Governor of that State under the Constitution, 
or under any law in force in that State, which have been assumed by the 
President by virtue of clause (a) of the said Proclamation, shall, subject 
to the superintendence, direction and control of the President, be exer- 
cised by the Governor of the said State. 
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During the past few years the office of the presidency has undergone 
a tremendous change both in authorities and in influence. The Chief Executive 
has been a source of many constitutional controversies in democratic countries 
because of lack of clear conventions and clear mandate by the provisions of 
the Constitution, particularly the nations of Asia and Africa. In the emerg- 
ing nations of Asia and Africa the role of the Chief Executive is yet disputed 
because of the inadequacy of an established pattern of presidential behavior. 
The presidency in India and the United States has also been a subject matter 
of great interest to students of political science because of its constitu- 
tional powers and prestige. The powers embodied in the constitution of both 
India and the United States have made this office a source of prestige and 
honor. 
This growing influence of the office of presidency in the United States 
and India tempted the author to look into the problems of constitutional pro- 
visions that go to make this change possible. I have taken up only one aspect 
of the constitution--the clauses that empower the president to deal with emer- 
gencies--both of the United States and India. These provisions--written or 
unwritten--have given to the office of the president a superiority over other 
organs of administration. Although the Constitution of the United States does 
not speak of any emergency powers of the president, incumbents to the office 
have used them. But in the Constitution of India, there stands a clear author- 
ity to the president to meet any emergency. The office of India presidency has 
hardly seen sixteen years of existence but during this limited number of years, 
the provisions of the Constitution to declare emergency have been evoked more 
than six times. This frequency posed a question as to its need and justifica- 
tion. In this research paper I have tried to find out the answers to all such 
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questions. 
The comparative method which I used in this research provided me enough 
insight to examine the provisions of some major constitutions. But, my main 
emphasis was to determine the role and scope of the emergency powers of the 
Indian presidency in the background of the American constitutional experiment. 
The three questions which I posed regarding the constitutional incorporation 
of emergency claims, the justification of their use and their effect in bring- 
ing about any change in the office have been answered. 
The conclusions and answers derived out of this research are that there 
is need for constitutional incorporation of emergency powers in modern times 
as the Chief Executive of many emerging nations, with no established conven- 
tion, may face difficulties in coping with emergencies endangering the safety 
of the nation. Secondly, the proclamation of emergencies and use of this 
authority by the President of India seems to be both justified and necessary 
under the circumstances. The provisions of the emergency powers written in 
India have brought about some changes in the office of the presidency in India 
in recent years. 
